Drew Fudenberg | lit.salon

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Drew Fudenberg | lit.salon

Drew Fudenberg

Born: 1957

Professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Born: 1957

Books by Drew Fudenberg (50 max)

Game theory

1991

Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole

Dynamic Models of Oligopoly: Harwood Fundamentals of Applied Economics (Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics)

2002

Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization an introduction and overview

1987

Dynamic models of oligopoly

1986

The theory of learning in games

1998

Pricing under the threat of entry by a sole supplier of a network good

1999

Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole

The neo-Luddite's lament: excessive upgrades in the software industry

1999

Glenn Ellison, Drew Fudenberg, Harvard Institute of Economic Research

A long-run collaboration on long-run games

2008

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine

The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting and with incomplete information

1984

Sequential bargaining with many buyers

1985

Predation without reputation

1985

On the robustness of equilibrium refinements

1986

Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player

1987

Finite player approximations to a continuum of players

1987

Reputation in the simultaneous play of multiple opponents

1987

On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games

1987

Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships

1987

On the robustness of equilibrium refinements

1987

Moral hazard and renegotiation in agency contracts

1988

Perfect Bayesian and sequential equilibria: a clarifying note

1988

Reputation, unobserved strategies, and active supermartingales

1988

Repeated games with long-run and short-run players

1988

Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games

1988

Equilibrium payoffs with long-run and short-run players and imperfect public information

1989

An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information

1989

The Folk Theorem with imperfect public information

1989

Monopoly and credibility in asset markets: an example

1989

Steady state learning and Nash equilibrium

1991

Explaining cooperation and commitment in repeated games

1991

Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players

1991

Self-confirming equilibrium

1991

Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed

1991

Learning mixed equilibria

1992

Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium

1996

Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine

Learning to play Bayesian games

2001

Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine

Bo yi lun

2002

game theory

2019